Linguistic Diversity

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ANNAMALAI UNIVERSITY

LINGUISTIC DIVERSITY

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FOREWORD

Linguistic Diversity formed a part of the Lectures, given at the Department of Linguistics, Annamalai University, by Dr M. W. Sugathapala De Silva of York University in the academic year 1974-'75 from October to December, 1974.

He has discussed in his lectures various aspects of sociolinguistics and both the students and the staff members were very much benefitted by his lectures. A general consensus arose among the staff members that the lectures must be available in print and when this was put to Dr. De Silva he has readily and cheerfully agreed to the proposal and he has prepared the entire manuscript before he left India.

We are really very happy to bring out this monograph under the series 'Extension Lectures on Linguistics' which includes Prof. M. B. Emeneau's *India and Historical Grammar*, Dr. S. M. Katre's *Lexicography*, Dr. S. K. Chatterji's *Dravidian* and Dr. M. Andronov's *Two Lectures on the Historicity of Language Families*. We are thankful to Dr. De Silva to have consented to our request.

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Annamalainagar

PREFACE

Linguistic Diversity consists of a selection of lectures given at the Centre of Advanced Study in Linguistics, Annamalai University, from October to December 1974. During this period I had the privilege of serving as Visiting Professor under the Commonwealth Educational Co-operation Programme, and I am naturally grateful to the British Council and the Indian UGC who are joint sponsors of the scheme. A special word of thanks is due to Professor S. Agesthialingom, the Director of the Centre, who nominated me for this position and has done a great deal more than his fair share to make me and my family comfortable at Annamalainagar. The main assignment at the Centre was to teach courses in Sociolinguistics for the second year M. A. students, but an equal proportion of my time was devoted to giving advanced seminars on linguistic diversity to the academic staff and research students of the Centre. These seminars have been most enjoyable in that the lengthy and often heated discussions that followed each paper have helped me to formulate my thoughts more clearly and precisely than I had originally presented them; if the participants have gained half as much from my presence, the purpose of my visit will have been served.

I am indebted to my own University at York for releasing me for a year to take up this work and other research in India. I am particularly grateful to my colleagues in the Department of Language who have willingly and ungrudgingly shared my teaching load throughout this period. My lectures as presented here will show a good deal of influence of the linguistic philosophy of Professor R. B. Le Page. I am certain that Le Page will not agree with everything I have said; where he agrees he would have said the same thing much better. However, during the past

ten years of association with him. he has made a definite impression upon my linguistic thinking and enabled me to redefine my position in linguistics.

I am very proud of the honour accorded to me by Professor S. Agesthialingom and the authorities of Annamalai University in undertaking to publish this work in their own publication programme; my thanks are due to everyone who has contributed to making it appear in the present form – this includes Mr. R. Balasubramanian, Junior Assistant, Linguistics Department who typed the manuscript for the printer, and of course the printer himself whose job is one that requires much patience and endurance.

Annamalai University
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M. W. SUGATHAPALA DE SILVA

I

INTRODUCTION

The underlying assumption in Linguistic science has always been that languages have systems. Every grammar book that has been written from Pāṇini to the present day has been an attempt to describe these systems; they profess to describe the phonology of the language, the morphology of the language, and, since of late, the syntax and semantics of the language. In doing this, every single grammar also assumes that the language under study is homogeneous. Some grammarians have imposed homogeneity upon languages by making their grammars prescriptive in character. Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī is an example of this category; as S. K. Chatterji has so aptly pointed out Pāṇini's grammar seems to be the culmination of an effort to restore the 'purity' of the Sanskrit language which had been 'corrupted' differently in different parts of the Āryāvarta[1]. It is understandable that the prescriptive grammarian would

deliberately choose to represent the language as homogeneous, leaving the 'vulgar vernaculars' entirely out of scene. However, the non-prescriptive and seemingly scientific grammars written as late as the present decade, in the climate of a variety of highly advanced linguistic theories have themselves assumed languages to be homogeneous. These works rarely cite variant usages and even when they do, such citations are restricted to a few lines of footnotes

It is, however, the case that native speakers of the languages described in these grammars often enter into iterative dialogues on the acceptability or otherwise of some sentences that the grammars seem to generate. One is, therefore, compelled to question the method by which the so-called homogeneous speech was collected for analysis. It would be grossly unfair to accuse these grammarians of not recognizing the existence of variation in language - this they certainly recognize and the word 'dialect' is in fact mentioned - but this recognition makes it all the more imperative that they should explain how the homogeneous speech was arrived at and the norm, of which the dialects, etc. are variations, was chosen. They would in other words make explicit the theory of their practice. Notice the following quotation from J. Lyons:[2] 'When we say that two people speak the same language we are of necessity abstracting from all sorts of difference in their speech .. These differences...are to be accounted for by the linguist. However, in the speech of any persons who are said to speak 'the same language' there will be what may be described as a 'common core' - a considerable overlap in the words they use, the manner in which they combine in sentences .. For simplicity of exposition, we shall assume that the language we are describing is uniform (by 'uniform' is meant dialectally and stylistically undifferentiated) ... and that all native speakers will agree whether an utterance is acceptable or not'. The assumpion that all native speakers would agree on

the acceptability of utterances is held by all generative grammarians, and perhaps implied by every descriptive grammarian irrespective of his theoretical commitment. The definition of the uniformity or the common core of language has rested on the faith in people's intuitive judgement, but extensive work, such as Quirks'[3] and Labov's[4] has shown conclusively that (to put it in Labov's words) 'the search for homogeneity in intuitive judgements is a failure'[5]. This being so, the data on which the grammar is based or the data that the grammar is capable of generating, still remains nothing more than the material the grammarian has thought up in his armchair and in his cursary glances at people's speech during his accidental acquaintances with speech behaviour. Some of the reasons for the failure of intuition tests are now well known and, therefore, this subject need not detain us here. Until the abstraction of common cores or homogeneity can be justified on reliable grounds, the nature of linguistic diversity (that everyone knows exists) precludes us from attaching any scientific value to the notion of homogeneity or to the works designed on the belief that the data involved therein is homogeneous.

Modern linguistics is also obsessed with techniques or procedures of evaluation between different theoretical approaches. The pedestrian view of evaluation that we wish to adopt is this: no grammar can be scientifically valid if the data involved therein is questionable as we have seen in the preceeding paragraph; between two grammars, the one to be commended is the one that accounts for a greater body of material Likewise between two linguistic theories, the superior one is that which accounts for a larger variety of verbal behaviour. For example, an approach which can account for all types of speech, including the special characteristics of creole situations, is decidedly superior to an approach that, because of its inherent philosophy, excludes mixed language varieties such as the creoles. In other words, it is claimed

that an approach based on diversity rather than homogeneity is the more worthy one. This claim is not new, for it has been defended many a time by various types of sociolinguists, but especially convincingly by Labov [6]. Let it not, however, be thought that the contribution made by theoretical linguistics, especially by the generative grammarians, to our understanding of how the individual acquires his language and what relationships there exist between his sentences, is in any way belittled. The indebtedness of linguists of all pursuasions to theoretical advancements in recent times will always be explicit. To quote the great grammarian Patanjali: 'anupāsitavṛddhānām vidyā nātiprasīdati'.

Linguistic change provides substantial evidence against homogeneity and system as characteristic of languages. As I have ventured to argue in the chapter on Linguistic change, if the language in some speech-community were homogeneous and if this homogeneous language contained a system that the speakers would internalize, then these two qualities, namely the homogeneity of the language and its possession of a system, would ensure that change would be blocked. For, every speaker would internalize the system correctly because of his innate language acquisition capacity and so forth, and impart this system to other individuals of subsequent generations who will in their turn internalize it. The belief in homogeneous systems is refuted by the fact that the speech habits in any given geographical area have never remained identical in the history of that area.

The division between diachrony and synchrony is an artificial one. The same processes are projected more intensely and noticeably in the diachronic plane than on the synchronic, but this is only an accidental result of the intensity of time involvement. The behaviour of one individual's speech in his own life time, as well as the relationships between the speech habits of different individuals and the changes in each person's speech

through acts of association and identification, constitute miniature episodes of linguistic change which only differ from diachronic changes in rate and intensity. In creole communities, which are linguistic continua varying between broad creole speech habits and superposed standard norms, one sees both synchronic and diachronic planes fused into one, illustrating the working of the same processes in the identical manner on both axes.

Although linguistics claims to be a science, linguists differ from other scientists, especially the natural scientists, in their ambivalent attitude to data. Grammarians have never been entirely faithful to their data, for they have ventured to assume some homogeneity in the midst of diversity without making explicit the methods by which they arrive at homogeneity. On the other hand, all linguistic hypotheses take account of a good deal of data whose acceptability, and therefore accuracy, are at least sometimes in doubt. In the circumstances, it is not incorrect to say that the grammarian has never examined his data comprehensively enough, especially because linguistic data in all its complexities and manifestations stares at the grammarian at all times; he does not have to set up laboratory culture programmes to identify his material.

The age-old tradition of grammar writing has rarely been questioned. Until very recently, when sociolinguistics became capable of theoretical pursuits, the basic assumptions and premises of the grammarian had never been challenged. The advancement of any discipline requires its practioners to peruse its premises, objectives and methodology at random intervals. This may therefore be viewed as a modest attempt to do this for linguistic studies; the need for such a perusal would be evident from the foregoing remarks. The essays published here are illustrative

of the implications of the diversity approach on descriptive grammar, historical linguistics and language teaching. All three are now based on the homogeneity principle. The implications of the belief in homogeneity on descriptive studies have been briefly mentioned already. For the historian, it produces a dilemma from which he cannot escape. On the one hand, he has to recognize homogeneous systems as landmarks in the course of time in order to derive the modern stage of his language from its ancestral forms; on the other hand, he is confronted with the problem of establishing a fit between homogeneity-cum-systematicity and change (As I have said above, homogeneity and systematicity must block change). Most language teachers in the past have been prescriptivists, and for prescriptivists homogeneity in language is a prerequisite. But if language teaching were viewed as an excercise designed to teach languages as they are actually used, the nature of linguistic diversity would not only push language teaching out of the classroom, it would also demonstrate that language learning alone exists and never language teaching.

The view expressed in this book is that language is a *process* rather than a *state*. Man's attitude to his environment distorts this fact. He wants to understand all processes as states; he yearns for a state of permanence for all things that are impermanent and which he cherishes. Attempts are always made to define stable landmarks in states of flux. Guided by this impulse he understands language as *state* and not as *process*. The result for the linguist is an interesting interaction between these two phenomena, with stable landmarks having to be shifted from time to time. The linguist must recognize this fact, or he will himself be deluded by his human urge to interpret every *process* as *state*. The work of the grammarians however shows that they have not been too concerned about this.

At this point I am sure to be asked the following question: If the grammare that have been written hitherto are unacceptable to you, how would you write your own grammars? In his 'The Structure of polylectal grammars' [7] Bickerton has given one possible answer to this. The answer I would give myself is this: The writing of the grammars is not an end in itself. The grammar must play the role of a medium through which the invidual's acquisition of his language and the formulation of his rules can be identified and demonstrated. In this sense, the descriptive grammarian's task should be to design his grammar as evidence for a hypothesis on man's learning behaviour. Any rules that the grammar book presents must be socially or psychologically substantiated as evidence of how the individual formalalises his linguistic rules. Where this does not happen, the rules formulated by the grammarian only remain as demonstrations of his own engineering skill in presenting derivations on paper. Labov once said that generative grammar is the best discovery procedure we have [8]. Indeed grammar must always function as a discovery procedure, and the linguist must have a firm opinion of what he is out to discover. If he ends up discovering the discovery procedure in multifarious manifestations he will never reach any significant goal in the search for the why and wherefore of man in the context of his special mental design and social adaptability.

II

COMPETENCE VERSUS LINGUISTIC HOMOGENEITY

Chomsky's famous dictum that 'linguistic theory is concerned with an ideal speaker listener, in a completely homogeneous speech-community' [1] has had many critics, too well known to be enumerated yet again. It is, therefore, unnecessary to make a further attempt to demonstrate the inadequacy of such notions as 'ideal speaker-listener' and 'completely homogeneous speech community'. It would not be unnecessary, however, to attempt to establish that these two notions, and the dichotomy of competence versus performance that Chomsky proposed at the same time, are contradictory. Whether Chomsky's notion of competence is sufficient or not to account for people's communicative ability need not detain us here. For the present purpose, we may understand competence as an individual's mastery rather than the collective mastery of a group, for, as a mentalistic concept, competence must be a phenomenon characterising each individual. In this sense the notion of competence is in complete harmony with the notion of linguistic diversity. Proponents of linguistic diversity as opposed to linguistic homogeneity can, therefore, still agree with Chomsky that 'every speaker of a language has mastered and internalized *a* genernative grammar that expresses *his* knowledge of *his* language' [2]. (My emphasis; 'internalize' might not be the most appropriate word, but it will not matter). We may even go further and agree that 'a distinction must be made between what the speaker of a language knows implicitly (what we may call his *competence*) and what he does (his *performance*)' [3]. Notice the use of the singular number each time competence has been defined; competence has always been shown to be something that '*each normal human has developed for himself*', and 'this competence ... we can call the grammar of *his* language [4] (My emphasis)'.

I believe that, in this original sense, competence is in contradistinction to the concept of linguistic homogeneity, for, being the grammar of each individual, competence may differ from individual to individual as much as performance. Diversity, then, and not homogeneity, is the implied characteristic of competence. I feel that this contradiction in the Chomskian stand point has been overshadowed by the highly pursuasive nature of his argument and that the line of demarcation between competence and performance, however valid, is not as clearcut as we are led to believe.

Unlike the Saussurian concept of langue, Chomskian competence is a mentalistic one. The idea of a generative grammar certainly implies that it must necessarily be mentalistic, for it is the individual who, with the powers of his reasoning, derives the rules from the limited data before him, and generates sentences with such rules as he has derived. As a corollary, then, it is also based on the individual as distinct from a larger group. It is, therefore, not inconceivable that competence may vary from individual to individual, and as such, the concept of a homogeneous speech-community is inadmissible in such a theory of competence. Cases where people disagree on the grammaticality of utterances are not uncommon. In his 'The study of language in its social context' and elsewhere, Labov demonstrates with real evidence from several such instances the futility of resorting to intuition as a procedure for discovering some homogeneity. Quirk in his 'Acceptablity in language' makes other similar observation on judgements of grammaticality. Every linguistics department with a sizeable graduate population is full of sentences/utterances on which the so-called native speaking graduates are unable to obtain full agreement. I have a collegue who collects 'grammatically deviant' sentences from printed papers and books; despite the editing processes involved

in printing and publishing, he has a fair number in his files. I have myself collected many differences in the works of Sinhalese writers despite the norm specification given to them by the diglossic nature of Sinhalese usage[5]. It has been shown, especially in Quirk's paper on acceptability in language, that people are unable to make a distinction between acceptability and grammaticality as readily as Chomsky implies. In all the instances I have cited above, the 'deviances' are not the result of 'such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest'[6]; from the standpoint of a supposedly correct norm, they may be 'errors (random or characteristic)' [7], but what are 'characteristic errors' if they are not regular deviations from hypothetical norms? And, what are regular deviations if they are not demonstrations of differences in competence? A linguist of the TG persuasion recently commented that a large number of linguists who have written about 'colourless green ideas sleep furiously' have not understood the distinction that Chomsky makes between acceptability and grammaticality. He is right; but the truth of the matter may lie deeper than that: might it not be the case that, being themselves human, they have been influenced by their own inability to distinguish clearly between acceptability and grammaticality?

The Saussurian Dichotomy of 'langue' and 'parole' has now been superceded by the 'competence-performance' dichotomy which is thought to be a more exact concept. The clumsiness of the Saussurian approach has been highlighted by Labov as 'the Saussurian paradox' in which 'the social aspect of language is studied by observing any one individual, but the individual aspect only by observing language in its social context' [8]. It is not possible to discover what langue is except via parole while, in its presentation, we are led to assume that langue, in some sense, pre-existed parole. However, despite this problem in the

Saussurian dichotomy, it is not inconceivable that a total inventory of items constituting langue can be collected Langue, in the final analysis is such an inventory of the 'total' range of items, and, in this sense, Saussure has presented some criteria, however crude, for the recognition of the wider linguistic community beyond the limits of the individual in order that a social language might be arrived at. In his approach, then, there is some justification for terms like 'the Tamil language', 'the English language', 'the German language' and so forth which have wider social connotations, and which may be said to 'exist' as such beyond the individuals whose speech habits those labels incorporate. Interpreted in the way I have done, the Chomskian concept of competence is different from this; it disallows such labels because of its concentration on the individual rather than on the community to which he belongs. If each individual possesses a competence which he has made for himself by his own mastery, and, therefore, individuals can, by definition, differ from one another in some ways, terms such as Tamil, English, German, etc. or Tamil of Madras, South Ceylon Sinhalese, Yorkshire English, etc. cease to be meaningful linguistic labels. It is not implied that these terms have no significance elsewhere outside linguistic theory; the point at issue is that all Chomskian grammars, like all traditional grammars, have fallen prey to the linguistically imprecise social belief that whole languages exist and that they alone matter. It is in this sense that the concept of competence has been ignored in favour of the concept of homogeneity. No generative grammar has been written on an individual's creative powers, i. e. to demonstrate the characteristics of his competence. As humans belonging to certain social, political and ethnic groups, we have been traditionally conditioned to believe that we speak the same language as the rest of our community; the influence of this belief has persuaded all grammarians to discount the individual's competence. Further more, the contradiction between 'competence' and 'homogeneous speech-community' that

Chomsky himself created shows that he has also become a victim of this popular notion. There is no other explanation one can give for Chomsky's curious claim that the individual-based competence model was aimed at a 'completely homogeneous speech-community'.

If each person has a grammar which he has mastered (probably with the apparatus provided by linguistic universals and / or innate capacities), then it is correct to assume that his mastery as well as the nature of his rules must depend on the extent of his exposure to linguistic goings-on or instances of performance. Let us take the three English sentences 'Give it to me', 'Give me it' and 'Give it me' as an illustration. The degree of exposure seems to be that almost all speakers have heard 'Give it to me' and have formulated a rule for that and similar utterances, while not all have heard the other two and consequently only some can produce them. Out of 'Give me it' and 'Give it me' the latter is even less possible for most speakers than the former; for most speakers of English in India, whose basic data happens to be more book-based than colloquial, both these sentences are impossible. The nature of rules, thus, depends upon the extent of data from which the speaker has had the opportunity to derive his rules. In this sense, the Bernsteinian assumption [9] that children in less sophisticated communities where there is little exposure to books, etc. and where verbal activity is of a limited nature have a comparatively limited range of sentence rules cannot be discarded as easily as as the Chomskians seem to wish.

Each person's grammar is always in a process of evolution. The child and the adult differ from each other not in the nature of evolution but only in the rate at which the evolution takes place. For reasons of necessity, the child has to adapt his

verbal behaviour faster and identify himself with the adult population that surrounds him. The adult is not so desperate and is able to communicate reasonably well with the competence he possesses at any given time. In spite of this sufficiency of his mechanism, however, the adult does not refrain from changing his grammar or from increasing his linguistic repertoire: the adult who learns to say 'Give it me' late in his life does just that, but his modifications are not limited to sporadic instances of this type. The point to be stressed is that where the rule schemata of a group of individuals do not correspond to one another's in all respects, it is a contradiction to speak of a homogeneous speech-community at any level. Diversity is, then, not a domain of performance alone. Many of the differences in performance demonstrate differences in competence. That the people living in a community which claims some social, political and cultural identity are able to communicate with one another is not in itself proof of their linguistic hemogeneity.

In terms of what we consider to be the reality of the situation, it is not possible to defend the grammars that have been written hitherto as scientific contributions to the study of human learning. In these works grammar has been interpreted as something belonging to the respective 'languages' rather than as abstractions with which the individual operates. Of the two contradicting pairs of expressions that Chomsky has given us, namely, 'homogeneous speech-community' and 'ideal speaker-listener' on the one hand and 'competence' and 'performance' on the other, the latter pair contains valid implications on the verbal behaviour of the individual; this we have seen in the foregoing discussion. All grammarians have, however, adopted an attitude which is compatible with the implications of the former pair and which excludes the latter altogether.

If, contrary to what the above discussion was intended to show, a Chomskian were to say that a contradiction does not exist and that the individual's competence and the deep grammar of the language are names of the same phenomenon, then it necessarily follows that the grammarians in these instances are writing grammars of the speech habits of particular individuals, or, at best, groups of individuals. If this were the case, then, aside from the embellishments in terminology and presentation, and indefensible claims, these grammars are little different from the older structuralist grammars which were written as unpretentious descriptions of the speech habits of chosen individuals.

The type of grammars I have referred to above can, then, be interpreted in one of two ways. Either they are no different from the earlier informant-based grammars, and owing to the untestable nature of their hypotheses their explanations remain conjectural embellishments; or, they embody a contradiction in that, in attempting to accept both notions of competence and homogeneity, their authors have neglected the individual and fallen for the 'whole language' ideal to which the concept of of competence is alien.

Can we write a grammar of X, if by X we mean an 'entire language' of some description, the location of which is, at best, uncertain ? The teaching grammars and generative grammars I have seen of languages for which socially institutionalized norms do not prevail have not been acclaimed by all 'native speakers' as accurate representations of their grammars. Any theory which claims that such homogeneous grammars are possible must accept that the children and the adults in a given specified community have the same competence, and that all adults share it equally. The acquisition of verbal behaviour, however, is an

ever-evolving process. Children acquire their verbal skills very rapidly, but they certainly do so gradually by first uttering single word sentences and learnig to make longer constructions in due course. Tests such as those administered by Roger Brown have shown that, contrary to the grammarian's belief, the child going through an earlier stage of language acquisition does not possess the competence of an older child. He interprets the older child's speech in terms of his own competence. Brown's study of the acquisition of the English tag question among two, three and four year-old American children has revealed that rule acquisition is a gradual process and that a person's competence at a given time is the total rule capacity he has at that time and no more. That some of the children that Brown tested were unable to produce the tag question as Brown himself did was not a mere performance defect but a limitation imposed upon the children's speech behaviour by the total repertoire of rules (i. e. competence) that they possessed at that time. Brown's test also showed that the ability or inability to produce certain sentence types is not age-related: among three-year-olds, some were able to produce passable tag questions better than others. This is equally true of the adult, for, not only do all adults not acquire the same competence by a certain age, but they also tend to defend their own grammars by criticising others' speech behaviour patterns. Brown's test with these children also demonstrated how, in his evolution from one stage to another, the child attempts make shift devices (or produce hybridisms) as tentative measure; this, again, is an equally true phenomenon in the adult behaviour. Any appearance of finiteness in a person's grammar is shortlived; it is certainly affected by the difference he observes and wishes to accommodate and consequenty a general flux begins to emerge. This flux results in the reshaping of his former rules as well as in changing the number of rules with which he generates his utterances. These are challenged again and dissolved in the process of further learning, and so it proceeds. States of flux are the rule in the evolution of behaviour

phenomena and any apparent systematisation is temporary and approximate. In this sense, linguistic continua embodying diversity are not mere performance phenomena but are directly linked with the individual's language mechanism that dictates part of his speech behaviour.

There is no argument with the truism that performance errors do occur for reasons such as memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, etc. The argument is with the approach that disregards the reasons for grammatical differences among people living in the so-called same speech-community. Chomskians seem to have differntiated between competence and performance more than it is warranted by the nature of linguistic phenomena.

In defence of the view that competence is clearly distinguishable from performance, many generative grammarians cite the case of young children who, they say, understand language more than they are able to produce with their vocal organs which are still developing. This supposed understanding is said to be 'passive performance' which is as much an indication of competence as 'active performance' or talking. The underlying assumption here is that the child understands what the adult says and therefore the adult's grammar is not alien to him. This, again, is yet another untestable hypothesis. Does the one-year-old child who can only speak one-word sentences respond to the utterance 'Look, daddy's coming' because he understands the structure of that utterance or because that utterance contains three words which he identifies as three sentences in his own language ? When I say that I understand the utterance 'me town going bus where stop tell,' I do not wish it in any way to be known that my competence enables me to generate 'sentences' like that; instead I would claim that I understand it because there

are enough semantically relevant elements in that 'sentence' for me to construct a suitable counterpart of my own and interpret the given sentence in terms of mine. One might go further and claim that people always interpret the sentences they hear in terms of their own sentences which they construct simultaneously. One cause of misunderstanding is the disagreement between the sentence given by the speaker and that constructed by the listener to interpret it. The child does exactly the same thing; he interprets 'Look, daddy's coming' as his 'Look. Daddy. Come' which for him are three sentences. His response, therefore, is not an indication of a competence which is greater than what is shown in his active performance or talking-Statements such as 'The five-year-old child has a full command of the grammar of his language' are meaningless if by 'his language' is meant a community language of some description. The only correct interpretation of 'his language' is 'the language which is his own and nobody else's', but in this sense that statement need not have been made, for it is redundant and tautologous. Every person has a competence which is the grammar with which he generates sentences of *his* language. The child is neither an exception to this nor a particularly significant example of this human behaviour The type of statement that I have criticised here illustrates the extent to which the notion of competence has been abandoned in favour of the notion of linguistic homogeneity and the extent to which the individuals' competence has been equated with supposedly homogeneous underlying structures that somehow exist in languages.

From the child to the adult, as well as from one child to another and one adult to another, there is a continuous process of evolution of experiences. The linguistic experience is only one such experience. Perhaps with the aid of his innate capacities, human reasoning, linguistic universals, and so forth (or without any of them, for we are unable to state these criteria with any

degree of certainty), each individual masters some mechanism for generating utterances; but by the very nature of the evolution of experience, these mechanisms are only tentative and approximate. Chomsky has asserted that only a native speaker can write a grammar of his language. Interpreted in terms of our point of view, this statement of his has a great deal of truth; for, only a speaker (of course with the necessary training) can make explicit the rules with which *he* genenates *his* utterances; others may influence his judgement and impose upon him their own rules which can first confuse him and then be accepted by him as if they were originally his own; this is the result of the contact created by him and the interrogator and also of the imprecise nature of his rules. Most of us have seen this happen when people's intuitive judgements are tested. (Although Chomsky's assertion can in this way be interpreted as supporting diversity, he did not, however, intend it that way; with this assertion he was, again, attempting to support the opposing view of homogeneity).

Let us consider the data from which the individuals learn their rules. As an accident of history, people living in ethnic, political and social communities, where communication with one another is an essential requirement, have learnt rules that contain approximate resemblances and therefore interpret one another's speech with some success. That these rules should roughly and approximately resemble one another's is to be expected from the nature of the data. Varying speech acts, pooled together as a collective data source, by people living in the same community, can influence the speech habits of all speakers in that community. Because of the nature of this data pool the tendency towards similarity should increase rather than decrease. That people living in the same community devise rules resembling each others' is, therefore, not surprising. For the same reason, to say that there is such similarity is also uninteresting. What is interesting

is that, despite the nature of the source of data, dissimilarities always prevail distinguishing one individual from another and, as history has shown us, the linguistic habits in the same geographical area change to an unrecognizable extent in course of time. Obviously, rules cannot be passed on from one individual to another or one generation to another in any precise way; if languages were homogeneous systems with their own deep structures and the implications of the notion of deep structure, not only should such transmission be possible but it should always happen.

In stating that language has no system, but that the individual imposes upon his language some pattern out of his own approximate abstractions, I have taken a line similar to Le Page's which is best stated in his own words. Here he is speaking after considerable work in 'multilingual societies'.

"If we deal first with a multilingual society we see children creating their systems of behaviour through exploration and apparent choice; we then see that there is no reason why the child in a monolingual society should have a learning facility that is essentially different-there is in any case really no such thing as a completely monolingual society. No longer, then, is a child seen as 'internalizing the system'-there is no system for him to internalize other than that which he himself created, which is already internal, and is already the idiocyncratic expression of this search for identity and role. Its relationship to that of other members of his community is a complex one. Whatever abstractions we as linguists make, none of them can ever enshrine the competence of the individual in the language-though for various working purposes they may approximate to a model of various aspects of that competence and none of them can be by themselves an adequate basis for a theory of

learning That theory must be a sociolinguistic one, and the linguistic theory of language itself must be sociolinguistic if it is to have either descriptive or explanation adequacy."[10]

I have argued against the traditional as well as modern grammar books which have assumed that there are homogeneous languages to form their subject matter. Although some defenders of these grammars claim that they represent homogeneous common cores of the languages, that claim is not a substantial one, for many of the native speakers of the so-called languages disagree with at least some of the grammatical rules they describe. Furthermore, there is no evidence to support the claim that the content of these books constitutes a common core. The belief in a common core implies a belief in diversity as well and sifting a common core out of diverse phenomena is not a task that can be accomplished by an armchair theorist. The scientific value of these works is, therefore, questionable. These grammarians try to state the grammars of people's verbal behaviour without any reference to the people or their verbal behaviour, but by making unsubstantiated conjectures about a linguistically vacuus notion called 'the language'.

I might now be asked how I would write my kind of grammars if those others are inadequate. For me, the writing of grammars is not an end in itself. The grammar, when written in relation to the realities of man's 'search for identity and role', becomes a valuable instrument with which man's socialization processes and learning behaviour can be understood. All grammatical theories are discovery procedures and so must be exercised in close observation of the use of language by individuals in social context. The approach I have outlined does not allow me to write grammars for their own-sake, that is in the

traditional sense; for, there are no grammars inherent in languages. Using the insights that the grammarians have given us in their zeal for the formulation of rules, one is, nonetheless, able to make statements about the ways in which people, both young and old, acquire their verbal behaviour and construct their own grammars. One is also able to observe how this acquisition corresponds to the acquisition of their knowledge of social attitudes and roles and to their acts of identification. In this sense, an approach devoted to the study of diversity makes a more positive contribution to the study of human learning than any homogeneous grammar can claim. To the 'homogeneous grammarian' all this might appear fragmentary, but there is nothing that this kind of study cannot do that the homogeneous grammars claim they can. A study of the individuals' acquisition of their competence can reveal the factors that enforce or constrain their learning, and a comparison of these factors over a wide range of individuals can provide a basis for generalizing on them. A comparison of the individuals' grammars in various stages of evolution can reveal universal tendencies in language acquisition. From what I have said about 'passive performance' it will be clear that this approach opens the door to a more realistic study of communication and to a better study of how people understand one another in spite of the differences in their competence

This notion of linguistic diversity and the related notion of linguistic continuum focus attention on hybridization and sporadic changes which are not accountable in terms of rigid systems. They are, however, in consonance with linguistic change as understood in historical linguistics; for they accept as an axiom that the individual's speech habits change and that the grammatical mechanisms with which utterances are constructed also change along with the widening of experience. The notion of change is basically related to diversity. The division into synchrony and diachrony is useful only as an operational device; there cannot be a ture bifurcation of that nature in linguistic evolution.

There is, in actual fact, little difference between the changes that take place in what is known as the synchronic plane, i. e. between persons at the same time, and diachronic changes implying evolution in the course of time. As I have pointed out before, the belief in homogeneous systems is contrary to the notion of linguistic change; if all speakers can be accounted for in terms of one deep structure pertaining to the language, then there is little justification for not setting up the same deep structure for all stages of the so-called same language inspite of the chronological distances between them. The Chomskian competence, very correctly, disallows this latter, but allows the former. The arbitrariness in this separate treatment is the direct result of the belief in sameness or homogeneity.

The questions that 'homogeneous grammars' cannot answer effectively are numerous. They are unable to show, except in the form of conjectures, how a person acquires his native language. They cannot throw any light on how people understand one another. Related to this is the question whether understanding requires from all participants that they operate with the same abstractions; if the answer to this is negative, how similar should their abstraction be and how is such similarity attained? As they are not interested in observing how individuals make generalizations from linguistic goings-on, grammarians are unable to make any study of the universalistic nature of linguistic abstractions. Being disinterested in the individual, they are also unable to study the processes of rule formation when, in growing up from infancy to adulthood, people acquire greater proficiency and evolve their competence. Their failure, in this way, to contribute to the study of learning stems from the fact that, having disregarded the individual they have imposed upon language a state of stability on the assumption that what are actually linguistic processes are stable and structured systems.

III

LINGUISTIC CHANGE

In the study of linguistic change, it is customary to trace the chronological evolution of languages from their parent languages which are generally represented by reconstructed formulae. In tracing such chronological evolution, systems are set up for the different stages of the language, including the proto-stage, and the changes from one stage to the next are stated in the form of rules. These organized tabulations of linguistic development are frequently exhaustive and account for the great bulk of the data. It is not customary in historical linguistics, however, to explain *why* changes occur in the way they do. Any explanations we have from the historian are of a very general nature; it is said, for instance, that changes are caused by geographical distance, lack of communication between groups, the impact of mass media, climatic changes, and so forth. Attempts have been made in recent times to explain some changes in terms of phonetic tendencies referred to as phonological universals. Historians have mentioned the influence of other languages as a relevant factor, but almost always other languages have been cited only as sources of borrowing. In dealing with the history of any Indian language, for example, the historian would show instances of borrowing from European languages. However, that

European languages have likewise borrowed from the Indian language in question, and that 'lending', so to speak, is as much a part of the history of the language as borrowing would not concern him. In this way, language contact has only received a superficial and onesided treatment from the average historian. Since the Linguistic Area Hypothesis of Emeneau [1] and others [2], there is, in the South Asian Field, some measure of interest in contact as a forceful agent of linguistic change. Some sociolinguists who are mainly concerned with pidgin and creole languages believe that contact is the most significant promoter of change. They claim that there are many aspects of linguistic change that the genetic hypothesis is not equipped to handle. It is not my intention in this paper to review any of these approaches in detail. What I propose to do is to draw from the work that has been done in historical linguistics and sociolinguistics and attempt to fill in certain gaps and raise some questions in terms of my own thinking on linguistic diversity

First of all, historical linguists have not presented any definitive criteria for determining where one language ends and another begins in the genealogical history of a language family. Although they have assumed wholesome languages as their data, they have only assumed the correctness of the popular labels such as Gujarati, Marathi, Ardhamagadhi, Magadhi and so forth. The result of this is that some data presented as belonging to different languages show as much resemblance as data given as different strata of the same language. I do not wish to make a big issue of this; I only want to stress that what the historian means by 'a language' is not something that he himself has defined but something which has been defined for him by the people- the butcher, the baker, the candlestick maker-who act upon their social, economic, religious, cultural and geographical loyalties.

In historical linguistics, it is assumed that change takes time. Changes do not happen overnight; it takes a generation or two before a change is crystallised. This belief is tacitly implied in the dichotomy of diachrony versus synchrony that Saussure has given us.[3] Synchronic study does not deal with change, but describes a particular state of *the* language, *état de langue*, because there is a homogeneous system to be referred to as the language in any given time. Diachronic study, on the other hand, shows the historical relationships between different states of *the* languages, between different *états de langue* and in so doing it demonstrates how one solid system has changed into another. It is these assumptions in historical linguistics that I wish to question first.

I have argued elsewhere in these lectures that languages do not have systems and that 'homogeneous speech-community' is only a myth. What humans see as systems in language are what they themselves have created or constructed on the basis of the data available to them in order to interpret and generate speech acts. Similarities must be expected in the abstractions that different individuals make in a community because they all use the same data pool for renewal of connection with linguistic goings-on and for formulating further rules or modifying the ones they had before. As I have said earlier, the interesting thing is not that there are such similarities but that diversity persists despite the nature of the data resources. If language has a system that man internalizes, then language must have pre-existed man, but one must belong to an extreme theistic persuasion to believe that language existed before man. Each individual, exposed to linguistic data, works out a grammar of his own, or, better, imposes upon the language he hears a tentative and approximate set of rules, which he uses as a rough guide. Let us call this the linguistic aspect of a person's competence. By the very nature of its formulation, the competence of one individual may differ from that of another. This is, in fact, the case, because there

are numerous grammatical differences among individuals living in the so-called 'same speech-community'. I have also argued that there is nothing finite or complete about the individual's competence, and that it evolves constantly. If the earliest stage of the individual's acquisition of some ability to use human language is taken as 'stage one', then it might be said that the subsequent stages embody changes with respect to that first stage. These changes are of a similar order to what is discussed in traditional diachronic studies. Linguistic change is, thus, a recurrent phenomenon. If the individual's competence at any time is the underlying mechanism of his speech performance, then, these recurrent changes demonstrate constant modifications in the underlying mechanism. Thus, what we have been conditioned to see in data with considerable age gaps between them can also be seen in a similar manner in any two stages in the development of one individual's language acquisition; any difference would only be in the intensity of easily identifiable changes.

If languages were homogeneous system, changes would be hard to come by. Being systems that people internalize, they would be internalized in the same way in order to maintain homogeneity. Likewise, these systems would be imparted to subsequent generations, or, subsequent generations would interanalize the system in the identical manner. System and homogeneity would thus perpetuate themselves. What seems to happen, however, is the opposite. Historical evolution is, therefore, in itself proof of the non-homogeneous and non-systemic nature of language.

Let me say this again. If the language in some speech-community were homogeneous and if this homogeneous language contained a system that the speakers would internalize, these two qualities, namely the homogeneity of the language and its possession of a system, would ensure that change, or at any rate

grammatical change, would be debarred; for, every speaker would discover the system correctly because of his innate language acquisition capacity, and would impart this system, through his performance (barring performance errors, of course), to other individuals and likewise to furture generations. The belief in homogeneous systems is refuted by the fact that the speech habits of any given geographical area have not remained identical in grammar even to the most conservative and traditional way of thinking.

Examined from the point of view of linguistic diversity, terms such as language, dialect and idiolect become less meaningful than they were intended to be. It was perhaps to overcome the problems created for the descriptive linguist by diversity that the term idiolect was first invented in 1948. In inventing this word, it was thought that there would be some uniformity, at least in the individual's speech. However, different registers, styles and so forth were subsequently discovered in every individual. Therefore, uniformity was claimed for the speech of one individual when he speaks in the same style or register. From the point of view that I have put forward, it will be clear that uniformity is not to be expected as a foregone conclusion even in such restricted usages, for the individual's ever-evolving competence is not situationally, stylistically or registerally definable, and tends to transgress all such boundaries. There is, for instance, nothing to stop a person using a grammatical construction or an idiom learnt under one kind of circumstance when he talks in a different type of situation. If there isn't a linguistically definable 'whole language' and even the notion of idiolect is not to be taken seriously to mean a uniform speech behaviour, the in-between, and rather uncertain', concept of dialect vanishes into thin air: for, if there are no defined languages, what are 'dialects' dialects of? All three terms, languages, dialect and idiolect, have very limited potential, and for the first two we have to rely on the definition given to us

by others, including the man in the street whose prejudices are not entirely compatible with scientific pursuit. Turning to historical linguistics, then, we ask, 'what are we writing histories of ?'

We write histories of linguistic behaviour of particular geographical areas and, where different geographical areas show striking similarities, in linguistic behaviour, we postulate that the forebears of these people might at one time have lived in the same speech-community. (This, of course, is not the only explanation possible). The notion of language families cannot be taken any deeper. To postulate that the forebears of some different groups of people lived in the same community at some remote time, it is not necessary to suppose that they were all of the same ethnic group. Although it has been said that a linguistic family does not imply ethnic identity, the belief does persist. The community of the forebears might well have been a multilingual one in the traditional sense; but we have no way of knowing this. What creole languages clearly show is that there is no relationship between ethnic grouping and linguistic grouping and that linguistic grouping is the result of multilingual contact situations rather than genetic determinants.

That contact motivates linguistic change is amply demonstrated in our own societies. Each person makes unconscious attempts to identify himself with various sectors of the community for many reasons, and in this endeavour he also adopts the speech behaviour of the members with whom he chooses to identify. This is done only in approximate measures because of the imitations imposed upon him by his ability to observe, and interference from his existing rules. Because of the intrinsic nature of the procdeures for rule formation that individuals adopt, diversity multiplies rather than diminishes. In this regard it is worth recalling Le Page's remarks on the individual's language acquisition and role identification:

"Each individual creates the systems for his verbal behaviour so that it shall resemable that of the group or groups with which from time to time he may wish to be identified, to the extent that:

a he can identify the group

b. he has both opportunity and ability to observe and analyse their behavioural systems.

c. his motivation is sufficiently strong to impel him to choose and adapt his behaviour accordingly

d. he is still able to adapt his behaviour".[4]

The diversity that is caused by these acts of identification often gives rise to continua of speech behaviour in which there is a fluctuation in the person's patterns of behaviour from one end to the other. This fluctuation depends upon how he chooses his target at any one time. Most societies present people with standards or norms of behaviour arrived at artificially and puristically. In such circumstances fluctuation is intensified as a result of norm specification. In most creole societies there are standard norms employed in the education system, such as standard English in the West Indian creole scene; in diglossic situations there are the prestigious norms the learning of which takes a considerable proportion of the learning time at school; and elsewhere there are standards like standard English in every region in Britain as well as the Southern Standard English thought of as the best standard by some. Individuals in such situations fluctuate from their own known behaviour towards the normative form, moving back and forth as the case demands. In the cline towards the normative, not everyone masters the set goals, and a wide variety of performance can, therefore, be observed in these situations. These differences show different degrees of deviation from the set norms as well as from the behaviour the person was used to before he was exposed to the

norm. Where norms are not explicitly specified, people attempt to see a hypothetical norm in the group with which they wish to be identified and in doing so generate a flux, just as the people in situations where norms have been prescribed extra-linguistic agents

As examples of explanations that the historical linguist is not prone to giving, let us take the tendency towards simplification and sporadic change that they have often discovered. Why do languages have a tendency towards simplification? What are the causes of sporadic changes? The reasons for these two phenomena are implicit in the following exerpt from J Lyons:

'Languages, as they develop through time and 'evolve' to meet the changing needs of the societies that use them for communication, can be regarded as *homeostatic* (or 'self-regulating'). Systems, the state of a language at any one time being 'regulated' by two opposing principles. The first of these (which is sometimes referred to as the principle of 'least effort') is the tendency to maximize the efficiency of the system ... its effect is to bring the syntagmatic length of words and utterances closer to the theoretical ideals. The other principle is 'the desire to be understood': this inhibits the shortening effect of the principle of 'least effort' by introducing redundancy at various levels. As a consequence, it is to be expected that the changing conditions of communication will tend to keep the two tendencies in balance'. [5]

The tendency towards simplification seems to be the result of the application of the principle of least effort, by reducing categories and features which are not entirely relevant to the message to be conveyed. People have a fair idea of what features are most relevant for the message and what features are not so relevant. They exercise this knowledge in circumstances which demand the greatest efficiency. Consider, for example, baby talk

and foreigner talk. When the mother points to the father returning home and says to the child 'Look, daddy come', she has removed from her usual sentences a number of redundant features including the copula and the -ing ending. When you leave a foreign person in your friend's house for a while and say 'Me go. You stay. Me come back', you exercise the same principle. The 'Me Jane you Tarzan' dialogue we have learnt to live with after the Tarzan films is yet another case in point. Likewise the Middle Indic reduction of the complexities of grammatical categories of Sanskrit, to change the three-term number system into a two-term one, the reduction of the Sanskrit past action denoting categories into a much fewer number, and so forth, are simplifications on the same line. The drift towards notionalization is another attempt towards simplification. Where grammatical categorization is not in harmony with notional recognition, people tend to modify the grammar in conformity with the notional requirements Expressions such as 'the committee have ' 'the government have ..' etc. used by some speakers of English illustrate this tendency

It has been observed, especially by Hockett, that languages tend to maintain redundancy in balance, the relative redundancy being approximately 50./·, in order to facilitate communication.[6] If redundancies were removed so that each element of the sentence had its own meaning and none other, and each meaning component was expressed by one and only one element, communication would be greatly impaired. Defective hearing of one element would ruin the entire message. In order to overcome this, redundancies are reintroduced to maintain a balance as required for communicability The redundancies thus introduced are not necessarily the ones that were previously taken out; speakers do not have a full and explicit knowledge of the operation of simplification despite their ability to simplify. It seems to be the case that where redundancy burdens are removed from one level, re-introduction of redundancies may or may not be

at the same level; they can, as my following examples will show, be at some other level. The point I wish to make is that the sources of these new redundancy features are not necessarily known, and they may be *ad hoc* operations. A good deal of the so-called sporadic innovations are these new features that speakers bring in for communication. Thus the ultimate cause of simplification as well as sporadic innovation is the homeostatic principle. Let me first give some examples.

In English a rough distinction can be made between sophisticated speech and uneducated gossip. The former is comparatively more complex from the point of view of its grammar, containing clause-embedding, etc. The sentences are relatively longer. Subordination which is a complex phenomenon is frequent. The latter uses simple sentences or conjoined sentences with the simple 'and' operation, and is usually less complex all round. To compensate for this, the 'language of gossip' is burdened with lexical repetitiveness and expressions such as 'he said', 'she said', 'and' 'so', 'you see' are heard too often to be missed. Similar speech behaviour can be noticed in other communities as well. These seem to be replacements of lost grammatical redundancies at the lexical level The same phenomenon can be seen when comparing Sanskrit with a Middle Indic Prakrit such as Pali. Much of Sanskrit grammar and phonology has been simplified in Pali. and the retrieval seems to be by lexical compensation. Here are some of the numerous instances of lexically blown-up expressions in Pali:

1. devatā ekam antam aṭṭhāsi ekam antam ṭhitā kho sā devatā...

   Literally: 'the deity on one side stood, on one side stood indeed that deity'.

   ie. 'the deity stood on one side'

2. bhagavā etad avoca idam avoca bhagavā idam vatvā sugato athāparam etad avoca satthā.

Literally: 'The Blessed one thus said, thus said the Blessed one, thus having said the wellfared one then again thus said the Teacher'

i. e. 'The Buddha said thus'

3. abhikkhantam bhante abhikkhantam bhante ukkujjitam vā bāham pasāreyya pasāritam vā bāham ukkujjeyya andhakāre vā telapajjotam padīpeyya ... evam eva ...

Literally: Well understood, Sir, well understood, Sir, like a stretched out arm was folded, like a folded arm was stretched out, like a lamp was lit in the dark, likewise

i e. 'I understood it perfectly, Sir'.

It also seems to be the case that where the context makes the meaning explicit, the grammatical reduction need not be replenished at any level, but such retrieval becomes imperative where the context is not immediately available. The tendency in the literary languages to employ learned borrowings or maintain archaic features might be partially accounted for in this way. This might also account for the tendency in the language of the novel and the short story in diglossic situations to drift towards colloquial usage, while other literature tends to retain the grammar of the high variety. If, in this way, coalescences in one place are retrieved elsewhere, it might be worth our while to examine the retrieval measures operating in various stages of a person's linguistic behaviour or in the chronological evolution of linguistic phenomena. This way we might also examine the validity of the hypothesis that redundancy is held in balance.

Evidence, and perhaps a model, for this is provided for the historian by creole data. Much has been written about pidginization and creolization of languages[7] not to require a discussion on processes of creolization here. Pidgin languages embody the same characteristics of reduction of redundancies

for efficiency as baby talk and foreigner talk to which I have already alluded. When pidgin languages became creoles (i. e. mother tongues of the speakers of these forms of speech) and were acquired as natural languages by children for daily communication, new redundancy phenomena needed to be introduced out of sheer necesity to take the place of those lost during pidginization. The sources of these new redundancies are not known for certain; a fair number of these might well be *ad hoc* or sporadic innovations which owe their presence to the igenuity of the speakers. In creole languages, the redundancy phenomena tend to fluctuate from social group to social group Because of the complexity of group identification, the same individual, often in the same discourse, changes his speech behaviour randomly. To make the situation even less systematic, many creole societies have linguistic norms thrust upon them by their educational systems, as is the use of standard British English in the West Indian creole communities. A large variety of speech behaviour is generated in these circumstances, and they range from extreme creole types to the standard norm. No person maintains a homogeneous linguistic system. This form of general flux that obtains in the creole situations is found in all linguistic communities though in a less intensified way, but the creole material proves conclusively the inadequacy of the homogeneity approach. It also shows the irrelevance of the bifurcation of linguistic evolution into two axes called diachronic and synchronic.

In order to illustrate briefly the fluctuation in creole languages, I give below four short texts collected from school children of the same age level in British Honduras:

Text 1

A. wʌns apana taim ǝeǝ waz ori lidl pigz
B. Once upon-a time there was three little pigs
C. Once upon a time there were three little pigs

A. dɛ̃ mi liv wiθ ðe maðə ã aftawədz
B. them *mi*-live with them mother and afterwards
C. they lived with their mother and in time

A. dɛ̃ ɒe sta. tu ge big ã ðɛ̃ ma se
B. them .. they start-to get big and them ma say
C. they ... they began to get big and their mother said

A. nau unu ni ge big so unu haftu go out
B. now you (pl) do get big so you have-to go out
C now you are getting big so you must all go out

A ã fain unu hous ã di fə's litl pɪg
B and find you house and the first little pɪg
C and find your own house and the first little pɪg

A fain wã mã ã se di man mi ga? sʌ̃ scra:
B fɪnd one man and he see the man mi-get some straw
C found a man and he saw the man had some straw

Text 2

A wʌns upana taim de wuz cri lil pɪgz
B once upon-a time there was three little pɪgs
C once upon a time there were three little pigs

A de justu liv wit deər madər ã wan die
B they used-to live with their mother and one day
C They lived with their mother, and one day

A de mada tuol dem dat die wər getiŋ
B they mother told them that they were getting
C their mother told them that they were getting

A tu big an die had tu gu an fain deər
B too big and they had to go and find their
C too big and (that) have to go and find their
they'd

A uon hous ... an di cri af ðem went out
B own house ... and the three of them went out
C own house ... and the three of them went out

A an di fərs wan sa a man wit sʌm scra:z
B and the first one say a man with some straws
C and the first one saw a man with some straws

Text 3

A di ma mi ha cri a di li pig dẽ an den
B The ma *mi*-have three of the little pig-them and then
C The mother had three of the little pigs and then

A i se wan did di ma se at ow unu ʃud gu
B he say one day the ma say that how you should go
C she said, one day the mother said, you should all go

A an bil jər uon hous a entaĩ wen dẽ si
B and build your own house and .. when-time when them see
C and build your own house and .. when they saw

A wã man mɪ di kʌ̃ wid stra dẽ aks di man
B one man mi-do-come with straw them ask the man
C a man coming with straw they asked the man

Text 4

A wʌne ʌpun taim deər wər crɪ litl pigs
B once upon time ther were three little pigs
C once upon a time there were three little pigs

A ɘat de wər big an his ...
B that they were big and his ...
C who were grown-up and their ...

A de haf deər mada an deər maðar seiz
B they have their mother and their mother says
C they had their mother and their mother said

A dat dei kjan gʌ an meik deər haus bikaz
B that they can go and make their house because
C that they can go and make their house because

A de ar big an sʌ de went an di fərst wan ...
B they are big and so they went and the first one ...
C they were grown-up so they went and the first one ...

A di fərst litl big sa ə man wit ... dat was
B the first little pig saw a man with ... that was
C the first little pig saw a man with ... who was

A kjariŋ sam stiks
B carrying some sticks
C carrying some sticks

I have borrowed these texts from Le stage, et al. (1973) [8]. I have modified the transcription (line A) for typographic convenience and it is hoped that my modifications will not affect the grammatical observations I wish to make. Line B is a literal rendering into English and line C a suitable translation. I have followed Le stage, et al. for translation. Some minor modifications have been made in the literal rendering in order to focus attention on the grammatical points I wish to take up. Some aspects of the grammatical diversity that obtains in these texts are tabulated below for convenient refernce; here I am citing examples in the normal English spelling

The first informant

This person conceives of *upon-a*, *start-to*, and *have-to* as single words; the plural inflection is used in the nouns (pigs), but the singular verbs occur with plural nouns (*pigs was*); in pronouns, a neutral *them* form is used for all forms of the third person plural pronoun; in verbs no distinction is made between singular and plural; past tense of verbs is produced in two ways: either the verbs is used in its neutral form (*find*, *see*, *say*) or the verb takes the prefix *mi-* (*mi-live*, *mi-got*).

The second informant

Like the first, this person, too, recognizes *upon-a* and *used-to* as single words; uses the plural inflection with nouns (*pigs*). but uses the singular verb with plural nouns sometimes (*pigs was*) unlike in the first informants language, the plural verbs are found at times (*were getting*); in the case of pronouns, both 'they' and 'their' are sometimes realized as, *they*, but the form *their* is also found for 'their'; 'them' is *them*. The past tense verbs are made up in two ways; rarely, verbs are prefixed with *used to* (*used to live*, 'lived' but more frequently inflected past tense is used unlike in the first informants' language (*told*, *went*, *saw*).

The third informant

Nouns are pluralized by adding them (*pig-them*); third person plural pronoun is *them*; third person singular *i* is the same for both masculine and feminine; verbs in the past tense are used without any inflection (*have, say, see, ask*).

The fourth informant

Nouns are pluralized with *-s* and verbs agree with the nouns for number (*pigs were*); 'they' and 'their' are distinguished; verbs are inflected for the past tense use (*went, saw*) but occasionally an uniflected verb is used (*have* 'had'); unlike the other informants, this one uses subordinate clauses as shown in the clauses beginning with *because, that* etc.

In conclusion: When linguistic behaviour is examined from a diversity point of view — for me there is no other point of view which is nearer to the realities of verbal behaviour—it becomes evident that the separation of diachrony from synchrony is only an accident of time and not of any theoretical interest. The subject matter and the analyses are the same whichever way linguistic behaviour is looked at. What changes have taken place in the linguistic habits in a given geographical area or in an individual from birth to death are worth tabulating: they will provide useful data. But the more significant thing to do is to examine as far as possible the cause of these changes. Such an examination can reveal how the individual, in the evolution of his competence, formulates new rules and what then happens to his old ones. This is an intrinsic part of his learning, and the study can, therefore, throw light on the process of human learning which is an area that interests me. This same approach can be employed to investigate the linguistic evolution in a geographical area during the course of time, and, provided the social history of the area is known, good information on

linguistic evolution can be gleaned. We have yet to discover the exact working of the homeostatic principle or the self-regulating tendency, and the products of contacts must be analysed not as inflicted loans upon a perfect genealogical development, but as forceful agents of linguistic evolution which would undermine the value of 'genetic' information as an accident of history. Where the fore-bears' status of linguistic homogeneity is not known for certain, 'genetic' can often become an indecisive label. If each individual's linguistic evolution is a development through contact-this I have attempted to show-then contact as the most forceful promoter of change is a tenable hypothesis to uphold in both dimensions. If this is so, communities where the individual's linguistic evolution and the historical evolution are fused, to project both at the same time, become highly valuable communities for the linguist. The study of creole communities, therefore, appears to be an essential component of linguistic research.

IV
FURTHER THOUGHTS ON DIGLOSSIA

The title of this paper suggests the existence of published work on the subject of diglossia. Charles Ferguson's paper on diglossia [1] which is now a classic in sociolinguistics has been followed by a number of descriptions of diglossic situations. A fair number of these has described south Asian instances [2]. To these works can be added my own writings on Sinhalese diglossia [3]. The phrase 'further thoughts' is, therefore, an appropriate title in the circumstances; 'Further thoughts' however, do not have to be 'new thoughts'.

In his original paper, Ferguson defines diglossia as:

'a relatively stable language situation in which, in addition to the primary dialects of the language (which may include a standard or regional standards), there is a very divergent,

highly codified (often grammatically more complex) superposed variety, the vehicle of a large and respected body of written literature, either of an earlier period or of another speech community, which is learned largely by formal education and is used for most written and formal spoken purposes but is not used by any sector of the community for ordinary conversation' [4].

In Ferguson's definition, diglossia presupposes a literate society (although all members of the society need not be literate); not all literate societies are diglossic, however.

Let us consider then what relationships there exist between written and spoken representatives of languages and which of them qualify for the name diglossia. Where a language with no previous history of writing is analysed and reduced to writing by a linguist (or some other person) for the first time, and where that phonemic (or some other) script is used to record faithfully what is spoken by the people in question, one can assume a one-to-one relationship between the spoken language and its written representation. Such correspondence, however, is shortlived. As a rule, spoken languages change more rapidly than written languages; because of the availability of a more stable model to which reference can be made for authority the written language tends to be more conservative. It is true that, when too large a gap is created by the changes in the spoken language and the conservatism of the written, the written form is modified in the direction of the spoken — this accounts for the differences between written Old Tamil and written Modern Tamil or written Old English and written Modern English; however, such innovations are exercised on the written language with much care and deliberation lest the form of the language might be damaged more than is warranted. As a result of this, a gap begins to prevail between the two forms almost from the time of the first codification.

There are four ways in which the resultant divergence between the written and spoken languages is represented. There are the more fortunate instances like Chinese in which the writing represents languages not linearly or syllabically but ideographically; there the same ideographs may be written at all times but, with the changes and diversification of the spoken languages. different persons may read the ideographs each in his own prounciation and imposing upon them his own grammer. The identity that binds together the ideographs and the spoken languages is the semantic value of the ideographs that is equally shared by all The learning of writing is a cumbersome process when each concept has a different picture to represent it but from the point of view of the relationship between speech and writing, the ideograph system seems to be an ideal one; it can always be said that the writing system is a true representation of each person's verbal behaviour. There, the written form does not exercise a direct influence on the spoken language; nor are major changes promulgated in the writing system by the changing speech habits, This is a case where the writing system does not motivate the creation of a diglossic situation

In language communities where the writing systems are syllabic or alphabetic, the written forms have specific implications of utterance. In this sense they are not like the ideographic. systems. An Old Tamil text cannot, for instance, be read as if it were modern. A passage of Old English cannot be read as if it were modern English. The reading of the older texts, in such cases, is not intelligible to those who lave not learnt them deliberately. In some situations of this type, there is a universal allegiance to the older written language because of its religious and cultural implications. Arabic is an instance of this. The older language, or Classical Arabic as it is known, has come down through the codification of the teachings of Islam and is, therefore, reverentially upheld by all as the pure representation

of the language. The standard literary language is thus common to all regions whether or not there is mutual intelligibility between the speech habits of different regions. This is a classic case of diglossia in which the day to day conversation is impracticable in the prestigious variety and is therefore, conducted in the vernaculars, but all prestigious activities are carried out in the High variety of language. This High or sacred form of language is taught in schools in orderto train the pupils to write correctly and speak suitably on formal occasions. Tamil seems to be an instance of this, too. The two varieties, High or prestigious and Low or vernacular, have mutually exclusive uses.

Then there are situations like the English one. Here the written language is not a prestigious model preserved from the past for any religious or such other reason. In English writing there are archaic characteristics insofar as the spelling system is reminicent of an older phase of the language, but the grammar and vocabulary as well as the phonology that the spelling represents are usable in day to day affairs if the speaker so wished. Unless a particular need required the use of dialectal features-for instance for dialogues in novels-the language represented in writing is well nigh uniform and is universally acclaimed as the standard. In situations such as this, the standard is chosen is terms of the prestige accorded to a particular regional variety or social variety by the population involved. In English, this prestige is enjoyed by the speech of the educated southerners, also referred to as Oxford English. Because this standared variety may be used in all situations, there are no mutually exclusive usages for the prestigious and local varieties. For this reason, English and other languages with the above characteristics do not qualify for diglossia as defined by Ferguson.

We now come to the last type which I have referred to elsewhere - as 'the divergent type'[5]. I have used the term 'divergent type' to mean language situations which have distinctly different written and spoken usages out of which the written form is never used for speaking even in the most formal occassions. Sinhalese falls into this category. In sinhalese, the High variety or the written variety is not used for speech at any time, and there are many features in the spoken usages that would not be permitted in the written language. This is clearly a case of diglossia, for it shows mutually exclusive domains for the two varieties, but it differs slightly from Ferguson's defining languages. The difference rests largely on the concept of prestige derived from the rather more restricted function of the High variety.

In studying the linguistic duality depicted in diglossia, Ferguson has chosen as his defining situations the mutually exclusive roles of a) standard German vis-a vis Swiss German in German speaking Switzerland. b) Classical Arabic vis-a-vis local Arabic varieties in the use of Arabic, c) Katharévusa vis-a-vis Dhimotiki in Greek and d) French vis-a-vis Creole in the Haitian creole situation. Each of these instances consists of two distinct varieties of language-Ferguson calls them High and Low (or H and L)-which are used in the performance of different social roles clearly distinguished from one another; the name 'H(igh)' is given to the 'very divergent, highly codified, superposed variety'. 'One of the most important features of diglossia', says Ferguson, 'is the specialization of function for H and L. In one set of situations only H is appropriate and in another only L, with the two sets overlapping only very slightly'. In his defining languages, H is used in religious sermons letter writings parliamentary speeches, university lectures, news broadcasts, newspaper editorials and poetry; instructions to servants, family conversations, 'soap operas' and folk literature are conducted in L. The High variety is, therefore, a prestigious variety, and 'the importance of using the right variety in the right situation can hardly be overstimated'.

In Sinhalese, however, the High variety in its full regalia- i. e. 'pure' H in Ferguson's words - is never used in oral communication except in reading: reading here means a faithful rendering of a text as written, which excludes the use of written texts as the basis of lectures and sermons. Thus, unlike in Ferguson's cases, religious sermons. parliamentary speeches and university lectures are not conducted in the High variety. There is not a single instance where the participants' social ranking – i. e. esteem, caste, seniority, monkhood, etc–requires the use of 'pure' H. If reading is not counted, it can safely be said that High Sinhalese in its full splendour is not spoken at all: it is the language of written Sinhalese.

It will have been seen from the foregoing that diglossia mplies a definable divergence, with the prestigious model having its own normative rules and domains of usage. This is why Chinese and English are not strictly diglossic while Arabic, Tamil and Sinhalese are. Since the publication of Ferguson's paper and the consequent acceptance of the term 'diglossia' as an effective label for these divergent types of linguistic behaviour, several sociolinguists [6] have attempted to enlarge the meaning of the term so much so that almost every complex speech community can now be regarded as diglossic by virtue of the interdependence of the differentiation of social roles and conventional variations in linguistic behaviour. In this enlarged meaning, wherever there is role–bound linguistic variation there seems to be diglossia and almost every language seems to fit the bill. The practice seems to be to discuss diglossia in conjunction with bilingualism, and with bilingualism often involving rules of choice (as does any set of varieties), bilingualism without diglossia seems to be a comparatively rare phenomenon; likewise communities which are characterized by neither diglossia nor bilingualism are, in Fishman's words, 'only very small, isolated and undifferentiated speech communities' [7]. Working within this enlarged frame of reference, Fishman concluded that 'bilingualism is essentially a characterization of individual linguistic behaviour whereas diglossia is a characterization of linguistic organization at the socio-cultural level' [8].

Besides paving the way for such theoretical approaches to the study of language in society, Ferguson's paper also provided an impetus to a number of scholars, most of whom are native-like speakers of the chosen languages, to examine and describe in detail the nature and functions of individual instances of diglossia. These studies are very significant contributions in that they provide a sizeable body of material from which valid and substantial conclusions may be drawn. A few scholars have attempted to do just that and derived from this phenomenon some general theoretical principles which are linguistically relevant [9].

On the basis of the types of diglossic situations discussed above including Sinhalese (and possibly Kannada) which are not covered in Ferguson's definition – it is possible to say that any linguistic sutuations which is collectively characterized by the following three principles may be viewed as an instance of diglossia:

a) There is a superposed variety; the characteristics of this superposed variety have been specified by local grammarians and therefore the divergences between the extreme form of this superposed variety and the local or natural speech habits are statable fairly clearly.

b) The two varieties function in mutually exclusive settings, graded in terms of prestige; these settings are clearly definable for the most part.

c) Both varieties are socio-culturally recognized as functionally distinct, and may be contained in the linguistic behaviour of the same individual in the following manner: a person, who is a native to such a community and has a mastery of the prescribed use of H, also knows the correct social use of L; although the converse is not true, the education systems in such communities aim at teaching H to all their members.

Diglossia owes its existance to the mythical belief that the rules we construct for our own use are actually systems that come to us from outside or learnt on best authority. This is a characteristic of group behaviour, for groups tend to look to external criteria to justify their unity. Sprott observes in this regard: [10]

'Because members of groups conceive of the standards of their groups as outside of them individually, because they can be put into words and communicated to a stranger or to a member, and because they can be a matter of reflection and discussion, one easily gets the idea that they really do come somehow or other from outside. The individual may have intentions of his own which conflict with the standards of his group and he feels 'coerced'. This standard may, indeed, arouse such reverence that their origin is attributed to some supernatural being. This, of course, does not happen in the case of smaller groups ... but it does happen in the larger inclusive groups of which we are all members. When group standards are thought of as something apart from the interacting of the group members, we tend to think of them as somehow 'imposed' upon them. This gives rise to the notion that man is naturally unsocial, and that law-givers or moralists must come along and rescue him from his nasty brutish ways. This is nonsense. The generation of, and acceptance of, standards which regulate conduct and preclude randomness is ... a prerequisite of social intercourse. The having of standards springs out of social intercourse; it is not imposed from outside upon it.'

Humans are also known for their desire to conceive of processes as states, and states of flux as rigid systems that are inherent in the behavioural phenomena. For them, therefore, the codified and specified norms have a greater attraction than the phenomena which have not been systematised for them by the prescriptivist. This explains the presistent belief in all diglossic situations that the High variety is superior. One of the most fundamental eauses, as well as one of the direct effects, of

diglossia is the myth which acclaims that the language which is spoken in the community is incorrect, and even non existent. In most societies people hold various subjective views on correctness, but the beliefs held in diglossic communities are more widespread and may command a consensus of opinion On this, Fergusion comments:

'In all the defining languages the speakers regard H as superior to L in a number of respects. Sometimes the feeling is so strong that H alone is regarded as real and L is reported 'not to exist'. Speakers of Arabic, for example, may say (in L) that so-and-so doesn't know Arabic. This normally means he doesn't know H, although he may be a fluent, effective speaker of L. If a non-speaker of Arabic asks an educated Arab for help in learning to speak Arabic the Arab will normally try to teach him H forms, insisting that these are the only ones to use. Very often, educated Arabs will maintain that they never use it constantly in all ordinary conversation ... there is usually a belief that H is somehow more beautiful, more logical, better able to express important thoughts, and the like. And this belief is held also by the speakers whose command of H is quite limited.'[11]

Let us see how Sinhalese illustrates this. Although various subjective views are held as to which spoken Sinhalese is good and which is bad, no speaker of Sinhalese would claim that he spoke High Sinhalese, if that term meant the literary variety. To this extent Sinhalese differs from Arabic, but the belief that literary Sinhalese is superior, more beautiful, more logical and more correct prevails at every level of the society. This belief that the spoken language is incorrect while the literary language alone is correct, and the knowledge that the latter is, nevertheless, not admissible for spoken usage, have persuaded at least one school of purists to create an artificial kind of Sinhalese by producing a blend of the two varieties. One example of this is as follows. In literary Sinhalese sentences, the subject word is

given in its nominative case form, and the finite verb agrees with the subject in number and person. Thus, the literary sentence *mama yami* 'I go' has the subject *mama* in the nominative case -the non-nominative form is *maa* – and the verb *yami* has the inflection - *mi* which signifies the first person singularity. The colloquial equivalent of this sentence is *mama yanawa*. In colloquial, nouns do not make a distinction between nominative and non-nominative, and the inflection - *nawa* in the verb signifies present tense; number and person are not indicated inflectionally. That the literary nominative form *mama* is identical with the colloquial word *mama* which has no non-nominative counterpart is coincidental. The purists, however, in their eye for correctness, believe that a distinction in the 'correct' variety is a distinction that must be maintained in all circumstances; and, that in this particular instance, if *mama* is nominative in literary, it must be nominative in the Sinhalese language as a whole. It has then been found that in colloquial *mama yanawa*, the nominative subject is accompanied by a verb which does not show agreement, and that lack of agreement where a nominative is involved is an error. One way of 'rectifying' this would be to have *mama yanawa* replaced by *mama yami* in colloquial Sinhalese: this the Sinhalese speakers' attitude to the duality would not allow, and the purists themselves are sensitive to this. The ingenious solution they have come up with is that, if nominative must not be used without agreeing verbs and if agreeing verbs are disallowed in colloquial Sinhalese, then the use of nominatives in colloquial Sinhalese must be abandoned, allowing non-nominative forms alone in that variety. As I have said above, the non-nominative equivalent of literary *mama* is *maa*. Consequently the purists have decreed that the colloquial Sinhalese sentence should be *maa yanawa*. Where the literary equivalent of a noun makes a distinction between nominative and non-nominative in its paradigm, the purists always use the non-nominative forms in their speech, at least in public.

Diglossia is a product of purism. The disparity between High and Low varieties stems from the belief that the past or sacred systems are more pure and should be cultivated in place of the modern and more secular or corrupted usages. Paṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* is one of the earliest known attempts to restore the past glory to a language which was being 'corrupted' by localisms in the further expansion of the population.[12] All prescriptive grammars embody this attitude. In the case of diglossia, purism is also associated with nativism. Kroeber defines nativism as follows:

'After two societies have come into sufficiently close contact for one to feel the other as definitely more populous, stronger, or better equipped, so that its own culture is in a process of being supplanted by the other, a conscious preservation effort or defence is produced. Such reactions have been called nativisitic endeavours or revivals'. [13]

As an illustration of how purism and nativism are responsible for the rise of diglossic behaviour, I shall give below a thumbnail sketch of the history of Sinhalese diglossia,[14] focussing attention on the various stages of nativistic endeavours. In languages with distinct High and Low varieties, the High varieties are, as a rule, sustained by a minority. Had it not been for the puritanical elite the literary variety of Sinhalese would have vanished leaving only its traces in the hybrid forms of the language. Minorities usually endeavour to preserve the institutions which symbolise them.

Sinhalese has lithic records dating from as early as the third century B.C. The earliest extant literary work, which belongs to the ninth century A.D shows that there have been earlier works of various types. Although there is no clear evidence to support such a thesis, it has been suggested that the language of the inscriptions was closer to the spoken language than to the literary. The inscriptions of the ninth and later centuries

have been written in a grammar which is identical to the grammar of the literary works belonging to these respective periods. If this similarity is of any significance it may be deduced that the grammar of the inscriptional language was never different from that of the language of literature. The inscriptions and the available literary works from the third century B.C. to the fifteenth century A.D. show that the literary language has gone through several stages of evolution: This is to be expected under normal circumstances. The grammar of the literary language of the present time, however, is no different from the literary grammar of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. It is through nativism that this state of affair has to be explained.

Until recently Sinhalese literature has been characterised by a clear-cut division of prose and poetry, producing alternating periods of prose literature and poetry. In the fifteenth century such a period of prose literature came to an end. Soon afterwards the island began to be invaded by European expansionists starting with the coming of the Portuguese in 1505 A.D. The resultant political turmoil was responsible for the cessation of all forms of creative activity for nearly two centuries. This period, from the fifteenth century onwards, is referred to as the decadent period of Sinhalese culture. The first movement for the revival of Sinhalese and Buddhist culture was launched by Välivita Saraṇankara (1698–1778) and I refer to this movement as the first stage of nativism and purism.

The Sinhalese felt that their culture and language had been suppressed by the successive colonial powers who had planted their customs and manners as well as religions and languages on their legitimate land. The nativists held the view that in order to restore the glory that Sinhalese culture once enjoyed, the right thing to do would be to copy the culture of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries - the last known segment of the Augustan age. This was the aim of the Saraṇankara campaign.

Saraṇankara, however, was not too concerned about the language. The grammar that Saraṇankara used in his writings is very similar to the grammar of the administrative documents written by the colonial powers at the time: they were all different from the Augustan models in grammar and resembled the spoken usage as we know it. Saraṇankara's concern was for the wider culture and so his personal campaign never concentrated on the language in isolation. If the grammatical tradition of the administrative documents and the writings of Saraṇankara were accepted by the subsequent scholars, the present disparity between the colloquial and literary usages might not have arisen. But that grammar was incompatible with the aspirations of the nativists.

The Saraṇankara movement produced a considerable number of scholars with a good command of the classical works. The significance of Saraṇankara's pupillary succession is known throughout the Sinhalese academic world today. These scholars were obsessed with the usual revivalist temperament which accepts axiomatically that revivalism, to be meaningful, must aim at restoring the characteristics of the Augustan age; it is acclaimed even today that the most outstanding Sinhalese writings are those written in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, namely, *amāvatura*, *Butsaraṇa* and *Saddharmaratnāvaliya*. The pupils of Saraṇankara took upon themselves the task of linguistic and literary revival based on the grammar and style of these works.

Naturally, the Augustan grammar needed to be taught to the people through prescriptive, pedagogical handbooks. In order to prepare such handbooks of classical grammar these scholars took as their guide the thirteenth century grammatical work known as the *Sidat sangarāva*; even now, the learning of the *Sidat sangarāva* is a requirement in the monastic institutions and the universities. This book had never been intended as a grammar of the Sinhalese language; its expressed aim was to show the peculiarities of the language of Sinhalese poetry. Nonetheless, it contained a fair

discussion on the nominal and verbal inflection and so had some reason to be accepted as the basis of textbooks on grammar. It is interesting that the most marked divergences between literary and colloquial Sinhalese are in noun and verb morphology.

The Saraṇankara Renaissance was responsible for the establishing of a number of seats of learning which subsequently gained an international reputation for classical Indic studies. The minority groups who felt most a sense of insecurity and inferiority as a result of foreign domination were products of these institutions. These groups consisted, as they still do, of vernacular school teachers whose subject, namely the Sinhalese language, had been pushed aside by the more pretigious languages of the successive foreign powers, the practitioners of indigenous medicine, whose efforts had been disregarded by the advent of western medicine, and the Buddhist clergy who have been always regarded as the custodians of Sinhalese culture. Most good indigenous physicians have always been required to learn Sanskrit through which their knowledge of medicine had to be gained; all Buddhist monks must learn Pali which is the language of the Buddhist canon. However, the only equipment that the vernacular school teacher had to possess was a knowledge of the Sinhalese language and, as such, the purity of Sinhalese was of paramount importance to him. The Sinhalese teachers were, consequently, the most insecure of the native triumvirate, and so it is no wonder that they exercised the powers that were in their command to inculcate the classical tradition through the school curriculum. They have always aspired for an even 'purer' brand of Sinhalese than what the other nativists wanted and have been responsible for the birth of what I have referred to as the second stage of purism; the main proponent of this was a school teacher, teacher trainer and school inspector by the name of Munidāsa Kumāraṇatunga. During this second stage, nativism strengthened its hold on schools and reinforced the teaching of classical grammar in the classroom. The movement known as the Hela Havula has a strong following in the country today and they

wield a powerful influence over the maintenance of classical Standards in the literary usage. Despite their attempts, however, hybridisms do occur in the literary usage but more on that subject presently. The purists' attitude to language is best summarised in the following words of Kumāraṇatunga which I give in my own translation:

'Nowadays some people seem to think that grammar is irrelevant. To him who suffers from indigestion, food is indeed a nuisance. From the primitive hunter's point of view, clothes are only things to laugh at. When one looks at things this way, it is no wonder that there are men who hate grammar. In civilized society, however, language needs grammar. If there is permission to violate the law, it will be to the mirth of the criminal. If, for the happiness and comfort of the criminal, social laws were allowed to be violated, civilization would begin to disappear straightaway. If there were permission to violate language rules, the ignorant ones would certainly be happy. It would provide a way to conceal their ignorance In this country alas, ignorance is erudition; knowledge is a thing to redicule, An attempt must urgently be made to remedy this situation.[15]

This is exactly what Sprott observes in human group behaviour in the passage I have already quoted from him[16].

The High variety in diglossic situations serves the same function as the model languages in many creole communities. For all intents and purposes, the High variety is imposed upon the community from outside, be it from the past history of the same community or from an entirely different community. The learning of this superposed variety resembles the learning of a second language. In one sense, however, there is a difference between a High variety in a diglossic situation and a second language in a multilingual setting. In the case of a second language, the first and second languages are necessarily used in a mutually exclusive manner, as far as situational criteria are concerned, but where there

are High varieties, they are only used where the use of the Low varieties is socially disallowed. Because of this distinction, the learning of the High usage cannot be performed in the normal way, that is by changing the individual's existing rules to accommodate the new ones, and so forth. The High variety has always to be acquired as extra rules rather than as expansions of rules; the expansion of the individual's competence takes place along the normal communicative axis. The implications of this on the individual's retention of rules and an our understanding of how people comprehend speech acts is considerable; this is especially so in situations like Sinhalese where the High variety is not spoken at all.

To illustrate the significance of diglossia studies for our understanding of linguistic comprehension, I can cite a comprehension test I once conducted in Ceylon. This was a test administered on about a thousand speakers of Sinhalese who were completely illiterate. The test was a simple one consisting of my reading to them a few passages from some newspapers and novels and asking them questions on each passage to test their comprehension. All these passages contained literary grammar which was distinct from colloquial grammar : as we know literary grammar is always more complex and more categories are overtly represented. There were a few instances where the Sanskrit lexis was a hindrance to these people's understanding. In each such case, they asked for the respective word to be explained. This was done by replacing such lexical items with easier, but still literary, words and phrases. The result of this test gave no evidence that these people had misunderstood any of the tests despite the grammar which was widely different from theirs. This result can be interpreted in two ways depending upon what theoretical stand one wishes to take If one wants to consider the High variety as entirely outside the linguistic competence of the Sinhalese speakers and hold the view that the underlying structure of Sinhalese does not contain the extra categories realized in the literary language, then these findings can be interpreted as follows.

The speakers ignore the added, superposed or redundant categories in the literary usage when they attempt to understand the content of literary works. The errors that even some Sinhalese authors make in literary grammar, or, to put it better, the hybridisms that are found in some modern literary works, can be a direct result of this redundant nature of the literary categories; writers wish to emulate the rules prescribed by the classical tradition but are constantly impelled by their own linguistic competence to disregard those extra features. The grammar of literary Sinhalese is thus outside the grammar of the Sinhalese language as used by the people in their daily social interaction.

I have myself held this view before. This does somehow appear to need some tidying up, however. It seems to me now that such a view requires a belief in linguistic homogeneity to the extent that the grammar of the language has to be thought of as a system inherent in it. To say that the literary grammar is outside the speaker's competence, interpreting thereby that literary grammar is something different from spoken grammar, one must assume that the spoken language has some homogeneous existence. Owing to this flaw in the above interpretation, I now wish to reject it. Now I would say instead that my findings are interesting data to the study of the processes of understanding. When a person listens to a speech act, he interprets each sentence in terms of a sentence which he constructs simultaneously and against which the given sentence is mapped. In interpretting sentences, listeners pay little attention to the sounds that do not match their constructs, and tend to reject them as noise. Understanding is not a sufficient criterion to prove that two speakers speak the same language. The only common features they necessarily require are some sort of lexical representation of semantic categories; everything else is interpretted in approximate measures. The diglossia test in question, in this sense, supports the diversity approach more than the notion of homogeneity, for the approximations in interpretation are

governed by the individual's competence. I have already said that the learning of literary rules is not, strictly speaking, of the same order as the furthering of one's competence.

In his paper on Kannada diglossia, William Bright[17] wishes to assume that the more complex literary characteristics constitute the deep structure of the language and that the less complex colloquial forms can be derived from the deep structure by deletion rules. This is an interesting hypothesis for two reasons. Firstly, it is in conformity with the history of the linguistic situation in that the older form can be treated as the basis of the later developments. Secondly, it makes the presentation of the relationship of the two varieties easier and look neater on paper. In my opinion, however, neither reason is substantial enough to warrant the acceptance of the view that the more complex and older form is the underlying structure. The first reason is deeply enmeshed in the notion of monogenesis: it implies that both phases constitute the same language. Further more, it disregards the social factors that might have motivated the revival of the older forms. Without such social factors the older languages might not have been retrieved; for there are many language situations which are not diglossic and which do not have retrieved older forms serving as prestigious forms. If the availability of an older stratum as the High variety is the prompter in the adoption of it as the underlying structure, the stating of the underlying structures in other languages which are non-diglossic must become a very difficult, if not an impossible, task. As for the second reason, the simplicity of presentation does not in itself constitute a plausible hypothesis.

Let us now move briefly on to the subject of hybridism in diglossia. Wherever the individual is required to learn a variety of language which is divergent from his own speech behaviour and to use it in circumstances which disallow the latter the usual speech behaviour often tends to influence the learning of the other much more than in normal circumstances of

linguistic contact. The prestige attached to the divergent variety intimidates the speaker to adopt it appropriately, but the mastery of it is inhibited by its artificiality and its comparatively restricted use. In the case of Sinhalese, for instance, the literary variety is restricted to writing. Where people are compelled to perform in the literary variety - as it has happened in the Sinhalese situation with the tremendous increase in the number of writers, their attempts are never totally successful. The two distinct forms of the diglossia can in this way form an 'internal' contact situation and generate a type of linguistic continuum with pidgin-like or creole-like forms, the properties of which can only be understood with reference to the given norms. Like post-creole continua, these situations provide interesting information on the learning behaviour of the individual. This kind of hybridism created by people in their attempts to perform in the High variety without having gained a full mastery of it is known in Arabic as well as in Sinhalese. Instances of hybridism have been reported in Tamil as well. Those hybrid types are neither the Low variety nor the orthodox High, and tend to fluctuate heavily. They are the result of attempts to perform in varieties which have redundant phenomena in terms of the individual's own speech behaviour which he uses as his grid. Elsewhere I have given examples of hybridisms in Sinhalese and discussed the nature of diglossic hybridisms in the Indic family.[18] Suffices it to say here that diglossia in this way furnishes evidence on the processes of language acquisition that the individual goes through all his life in the same way as creole situations do, and would continue to be a profitable field for the sociolinguist.

I want, in conclusion, to make some comments on literacy in diglossic situations. Learning to read and write the letters of the alphabet, or even spell words correctly, does not in itself constitute literacy in diglossia. First of all there may be letters that only represent sounds used in the literary variety and because of the impact of the individual's vernacular. the learning of the appropriate pronunciation as well as the choice of the

correct letters might be handicapped. To be literate in diglossia, one must write correctly. Correctness implies the prescribed use of literary grammar in addition to the spelling Thus, although the percentage of people who can read and write may be high, the truly literate community may be very small in diglossic circumstances.

The advantages of diglossia studies are, then, obvious. These studies throw much light on the individual's acquisition of behaviour as well as on his attitude to prescribed behaviour norms and the result of this attitude. Here we observe learning on a slightly different axis from the normal one we have briefly referred to before from time to time. Diglossia also highlights the human tendency to systematise behaviour and interpret such systems as coming from outside to rescue the human heritage.

V

LANGUAGE TEACHING AND LANGUAGE TESTING

In this paper I do not propose to make any concrete suggestions on how to improve the techniques of language teaching or language testing. Instead I wish to take a critical look at the notion of language teaching and testing both from the point of view of linguistic diversity as well as from the Chomskian point of view on language acquisition. I shall naturally touch upon the subject of 'Linguistics in language teaching' which has received some attention in recent years.

Chomsky's view which is too well known to be quoted at length, is that humans are endowed with an innate capacity for language and are therefore capable of formulating a grammar for a language on the basis of very limited quantities of data. Biologists have also claimed that human brains are specially

designed for language acquisition, and psycholinguists, working on various types of brain damage, have found that this claim is a tenable one. The implication of all this is that languages are not taught but are learnt and that this learning is facilitated by the human-ness of the learner and by the structure of his brain. It has also been demonstrated that language acquisition is not dependent upon intelligence.

The diversity approach that I have advocated in the earlier papers also suggests that, under normal circumstances, languages are *learnt* rather than taught; the conditions under which this learning takes place have been clearly stated in Le Page's law with four riders which I have quoted already, namely,

'Each individual creates the system for his verbal behaviour so that it shall resemble that of the group or groups with which from time to time he may wish to be identified, to the extent that :

(a) he can identify the groups

(b) he has both opportunity and ability to observe and analyse their behavioural systems

(c) his motivation is sufficiently strong to impel him to choose and adapt his behaviour accordingly

(d) he is still able to adapt his behaviour'[1]

Le Page believes that language learning is not different from the acquisition of any behavioural system and takes a sociological approach. After his survey of multilingualism in the British Honduras, he makes the following further observation on learning, particularly on motivation:

'Learning must now be seen as, to a large extent, a socially determined process. One's ability to learn, to change the rules for one's behaviour, is constrained by one's motivation to do so; one's motivation is constrained by feed-back from society as to the chances of attaining any particular goal ...'

'It should be stated, in order to remove any possible misunderstanding, that no *conscious* processes are necessarily involved here. Moreover, the model implied is not one of cause-and-effect but an organic and symbiotic model in which the development of *all* behavioural systems interacts with all aspects of personal growth in a particular environment'.[2]

Both the Chomskian approach and the sociological approach insist on learning and neither invokes the concept of teaching. Language teaching, however, is a major industry in education today. It is, therefore, not inexpedient to take a critical and dispassionate look at the role of the language teacher in the context of language learning, and on the basis of it, examine the content and value of language testing devices.

I do not think for a moment that any language teacher will disagree with the view that language learning does not necessarily require a teacher. Every human being learns his first language without the aid of any teachers He only has models who provide him with data on which he formulates his grammar The basic instruments he needs, namely, the capacity of his brain and his memory, are always at his disposal. There are also millions of people who have learnt second and third languages under conditions similar to the first-that is, of their own accord and without any one playing the role of teacher-and acquired a proficiency conditional upon the four riders that Le Page's law provides.

If the learning of the first language does not involve teachers, and if second languages are often learnt in ways similar to the first, the significance of the teacher and the classroom for language learning becomes uncertain. There are, in fact, people who have been through classroom teaching and yet have not acquired a reasonable mastery of the target language. In the context of this, the role of the teacher becomes very insignificant. To make the matter more complicated, we have no way of saying

for certain that those who succeed in learning languages at school do so because of the efficiency of the teaching system or due to some other reason. The learner's motivation. for instance, is not a necessary product of the classroom; neither are the learner's adaptability, his exposure to the language outside the classroom and his ability to change his behaviour to suit the situation

I do not wish to belittle the genuine attempts made by teachers, such as those teaching English in India, to provide some language skills for people who do not have a direct contact with the native speakers of the target language. Many people in India learn some English through the efforts of these teachers. But, every teacher will agree that since the decline of the use of English outside the classroom, the standards have fallen to such a level that even many people who have learnt through the English medium are unable to converse in English or comprehend English very much. They will therefore agree that the classroom is no substitute for the language speaking community. Where such communities are not available for the target languages there might still be a demand from some sectors of the population to learn those languages. Experimentations on how classroom techniques might be improved are very important in this context. Any comment that I make below that might appear adverse is not intended as an attack on teaching or the teacher. The point I wish to make is that evaluation between different teaching methods as well as between different types of teaching materials is not as easy as it might appear because of many variables that the assesser is unable to control; because of this testing is a very difficult. if not an impossible task.

The learning of a language is different from the learning of mathematics or engineering. While every effective learning requires motivation, subjects like mathematics cannot be learnt by zealously associating with mathematicians or by watching them work. Such disciplines need teaching, and therefore the

role of the mathematics teacher (for instance) is a positive one. Effective language learning, on the other hand, requires observation, participation, association and so forth as necessary conditions. Without them the learning might be severely impaired. The most effective role that the language teacher can play is that of another speaker of the target language so that the student will be provided with a micro-community in which the language may be observed, analysed, adopted and so forth; the student in such a situation becomes a participant and observer rather than behave in a teacher-pupil frame of reference.

When we discuss the learning of languages at school it is not impertinent to consider for a moment how the child acquires his first language and the adult learns a second language. The child spends a great deal of his time observing the social activity that goes on around him. He observes the different forms of behaviour of the adults when they deal with him. He has sufficient skill to identify those that are most involved with him and to differentiate them from others. He observes the verbal behaviour of these adults simultaneously and chooses to identify himself with some but not others. The infant, for instance, cries when some people talk to him but enters into a non-verbal communication with others. Partly because he makes identifications in this way and chooses to associate with people accordingly, and partly because the corresponding verbal behaviour of the respective groups in constantly heard and observed, he learns, when verbal articulation becomes physically possible, to speak the language of the chosen groups. Or, to put it more precisely, when he learns to formulate a grammar for his own use he uses the speech acts of those chosen persons as his primary data. The process of making abstractions and formulations continues at a considerable rate until he becomes proficient in communicating with his fellow men. Becoming an adult, however, does not block this process, for, as I have said before, the adult continues with his acts of identification and changes his verbal behaviour accordingly.

The adult's behaviour becomes very clear when he is placed in an environment where alien languages are spoken Just like the child who spends a great deal of time observing and analysing behavioural patterns, the adult may spend a year or two drawing his own conclusions before he arrives at a workable grammar. Because he is physically able to articulate speech sounds, he may attempt to talk in the foreign language without waiting too long. The possession of a system of which he has a full mastery may interfere with the acquisition of the new speech behaviour. But these obstacles have been overcome by many adults, for they have learnt to speak foreign languages reasonably well.

Let us now consider adult communities that live in foreign lands but fail to acquire the speech habits of the land. Among the symptoms of such groups, the following are significant for us:

(a) They do not wish to identify with the native population. The reasons for this may be complex and are beyond the scope of this paper.

(b) Because of the availability of their own fellow men to communicate with, the natural urge for communication is easily satisfied. Consequently, they deny themselves the opportunity to observe the behavioural systems of the natives. Where there is no observation there is no analysis.

(c) They do not have the motivation to adapt their behaviour.

What I have just said is that where people have failed to master the speech habits of the foreign land they are in, they have effectively proved the correctness of Le Page's riders. The actual communities that come to mind in this regard are the Indo-Pakistani immigrants in the United Kingdom who have come from working class and lower-middle class backgrounds. Many

adults in these communities fit the picture I have just described and more women fall into this category than men. Many young children, on the other hand, want to behave like their counterparts in the native community and without any inhibitions they endeavour to identify, observe and change. Being young, they are also still able to adapt their behaviour. The immigrant children who are denied by their parents the opportunity to mix with English children face a very difficult situation because their command of English rarely improves despite the specialised teaching that is provided for them. The teacher's role is a very difficult and ineffective one in this case, and attempts, are made to provide language summer camps and so forth to help the children of this category. There is virtually an admission of defeat on the part of the class-room teacher. This situation is not restricted to the Indo-Pakistanis in the U. K.; similar communities are found in the U. S. and other parts of the world.

In the light of what we have observed so far, let us now consider how efficacious the classroom is as a setting for language learning. We have noticed that the learning of language is interdependent with the learning of other behavioural systems and that any learning of this order is only possible if sufficient criteria are available to facilitate identification, observation and analysis and to provide strong motivation. The classroom, at least in its present state, falls far short of this. With whom is the learner to identify himself ? What choice has he any way ? Is the teacher acceptable to all pupils as a model worth copying? Even if the teacher were an acceptable model, what opportunity does the pupil have to study his or her verbal behaviour in relation to the rest of his or her behavioural systems ?

Another defect in the clasroom situation, which is not often understood, is that it denies the pupil the opportunity to observe and analyse even the speech behaviour presented to them, let alone other behavioural systems. This is most noticeable in the way the text-books are graded and the lessons conducted, for

each module of a lesson is the product of the textbook writer's or the teacher's own observation and analysis presented in a form that precludes the exercising of the pupil's natural potentials for linguistic analysis or rule formulation. I shall come back to this when I will discuss the nature of textbooks for language learning. As for motivation, the classroom condition is not able to provide any, and whatever motivation that a pupil might have is something he has brought into the classroom from outside, e. g. high aspirations in life, parental reward, love with the English mistress, and so forth. The danger is that the design of the lesson and of the textbook is perforce so uniform and the classroom structure is unable to do anything to break this rigid uniformity - that motivation (except where it is pure love with the English teacher) is in danger of being killed. Although the young pupil is able to adapt his behaviour more readily and easily than the adult, he is constantly afflicted by inhibitions arising out of the fact that he is expected to perform in the presence of the teacher who in his opinion continues to know more than he at all times, as well as before his peers whose reactions he is not sure about and who will be prone to rediculing him when he makes an ass of himself.

The question might he asked, however, that if the classroom is not a conducive place for language education, how I would account for the successes that classrooms have produced. For, there are some people who have acquired a reasonable command of a foreign language without having any direct experience with the native speakers of it. One can think of many answers to this. It is more than likely that the people in question had been strongly motivated and had used the language outside the classroom, as far as feasible in the circumstances, in order to gain a mastery of it. The classroom cannot take the credit for the people's motivation or for the work they do when they are outside. The efficacy of a method can be said to be proved if and only if that method produces the same or similar results each time it is applied. The classroom can only claim

to be a successful instrument of language education if all persons who use it succeed equally, or if all persons who do not succeed can be shown to have some extraneous cause of failure. Such a claim, the classroom can never justify.

Let me now come to the language textbooks. If the Chomskian hypothesis of language acquisition is valid, then organized or graded textbooks are a device to dull the man's capacity for language acquisition rather than alert it. It is evident that the human learner, irrespective of his age, formulates his rules by observing disorganized, ungraded language data that he hears every day in his life The child's language acquisition is sufficient proof of this. No experiment has ever been made on presenting young children with graded material, whereby he will only be exposed to a select member of grammatical categories at any one time There is no evidence, therefore, to support the textbook writer's assumption that structured language courses are the best. This assumption does not derive from the actual language learning behaviour of the humans nor is it justified by the result it produces. Most language textbooks written as graded or structured courses often frustrate the student; the student, for instance, finds that he can only say it in the present tense, and the past tense will not be available to him until lesson seventeen. It may be that the course organizer assumes that the brain should be presented with grammatical information arranged in an order of increasing complexity. It has not, however, been proven by any biologist or psychologist that the human brain is designed to receive information in such an order. If, on the other hand, the brain has the ability to analyse random and unstructured language data, and if this is the way it formulates language rules, then to give it ready made solutions would be depriving it of the exercise of its capacity. 'One can think of the child' says Le Page as at each stage a searching organism, searching among clusters which he himself has established from those initial arbitrary beginnings for an identity and a role'[2]. This is exactly what the classroom and

the structured textbook disallows. The child has to perform this exercise outside the classroom, in the play field and engaged in peer group activity.

The language teacher's dilemma, whether he realises it or not, is not an easy one to solve. The uniformity in style and so forth that he has to expect from the teaching materials, and consequently from the learner, is not at all in consonance with the normal verbal behaviour of the speakers of the language that is taught. The diversity in the verbal behaviour of the native speakers cannot reasonably be expected from a classroom curriculum. To overcome this problem, lessons are often designed on what is usually referred to as the situational or the contextual method. The notion of contextual method, however, only provides a drama. Inside each plot, what is presented is, again, structured material arranged in terms of grammatical and lexical complexity.

Let us now take up the question of language testing. Language tests are designed to ellicit how much language the pupil has acquired and retained during the period he has been exposed to classroom teaching. Another kind of test is the test of the success of a particular method of teaching in contrast to other methods. It is my claim that no test can even be designed to test the efficiency of classroom teaching or of a particular method as opposed to another. The reasons for this are many. The leaner's language acquisition is never limited to what he hears or does in the classroom: he reads books and talks to others - infact he is encouraged to talk to others; in such involvements, his brain analyses linguistic information and provides tentative grammars for his use at all times. If under such circumstances a pupil scored a very high mark in a language proficiency test, that result can reveal nothing about classroom teaching or the particular method. Children score high marks due to a wide variety of factors which are difficult to quantify and whose relative contribution to

the children's performance at tests is hard to assess. To make the tester's task even less enviable, some pupils deliberately refuse to answer test questions. The human factors are important here, but cannot be overcome. The pupil may not like the teacher and may therefore refuse to open his mouth; to him a question may appear stupid and irrelevant; he may deliberately want to fail the test; and so forth. As these variables cannot be controlled but are involved in the test assessment, the pupil, in these instances, has to be given a zero grade. There is invariably another type of pupil who memorises the material that the book provides and loyally and dutifully answers the test to his best capacity. He may or may not have any command of the language outside the sentence patterns he memorised; he may be a bad mixer who is rejected by the other pupils for being the teacher's boot-licker. That he scores more marks than the previous one says nothing about the proficiency each has in the language. The former pupil, the trick player, may have a better command of the language owing to his language acquisition under conditions conducive to it, e. g. peer group interaction.

Much is being said nowadays on the possible contributions of linguistics to the teaching of languages. It seems, however, very unlikely that linguistics can make any worthwhile contribution in this regard. Any contribution that might be made would be by way of using the linguist's knowledge of language acquisition for improving classroom techniques. Linguists' statement about the nature of grammatical rules, etc., however, do not have any psychological or sociological validity to be used for this purpose. We have, for instance, been led to believe by modern grammarians that, in 'internalizing' or mastering the grammar of their language, people derive rules in some order. Certain rules are said to precede others. It is indeed true that the finished (say, the tag question) must be preceded by a number of processing devices (e. g. involving negation and interrogation). It cannot be said for certain, however, that the rules that precede the end product have a definite order except that for the purposes of formal representation on paper some

orders appear more satisfactory than others. In the case of the tag question, for instance, does negation actually precede interrogation or follow it? Or, in the case of relativization, is the pronoun changed into a relative pronoun after the sentence is moved to the left or before? When rules do not have any psychological validity they cannot be used as a guide formulating teaching devices

The only linguists who have taken an interest in language teaching are those that have worked on contrastive analyses on structuralist principles These contrastive studies have, however, been overvalued. They use the term 'interference' (which Weinreich used differently in 1953) to mean a fact about language learning when it pertains to distinct languages. Thus, when a Spaniard learns English his Spanish interferes. When a German learns English his German interferes. These works attune the unsophisticated language teacher to look for interference where interference has been predicted, and so some teachers, rather naively, notice interference even where no error has actually been made by the learner. Because of such drawbacks, contrastive analyses cannot be used by teachers who have had no linguistic training; for the linguistically trained person, they are redundant, for he knows that one cause of error is the influence of the native language.

In learning new forms of behaviour every person formulates his rules in terms of his existing ones at least as a starter, and in this sense 'interference' is a phenomenon of learning. It is not limited to foreign language situations. The amount of interference depends on the person's ability to observe and analyse and adapt his behaviour accordingly. No categorical statements can, therefore, be made on interference in language learning situations. In confining interference to foreign language situations only, and suggesting (covertly) that interference is independent of factors such as ability to observe, etc., contrastive analysts have misrepresented linguistic behaviour and the learning strategies of the individual.

In conclusion, it is no exaggeration to say that no attempt to improve language teaching and testing can be fully evaluated. The variables which are beyond the control of the evaluator always block proper quantification of judgements. Efforts must still be made to implement effective teaching methods, but they must, for the most part, be designed on hunches and experience rather than on 'scientific' results of evaluation. The teacher's role in this context will have to remain one of dedication and enterprise. No one is able to help him with his task. Linguists have rightly refused to interfere with language teaching for which their theoretical training is of little use. The teacher therefore is unique, but unfortunately he has no means of claiming credit even when credit is due to him.

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